UKRAINE BEYOND 2019: WHERE SHOULD WESTERN DEMOCRACIES ASSIST?
EUROPEAN VALUES THINK-TANK
The European Values Think-Tank is a non-governmental policy institute defending liberal democracy. Our vision is that of a free, safe and prosperous Czech Republic within Central Europe that is an integral part of the West. We help to face aggressive regimes, radicalisation within the society, the spread of authoritarian tendencies and extremist ideologies including Islamism.

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KREMLIN WATCH PROGRAM
Kremlin Watch is a strategic program of the European Values Think-Tank which aims to expose and confront instruments of Russian influence and disinformation operations focused against Western democracies.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Five years ago, Ukrainians took to the streets to completely change the country’s policy. That was how the Maidan began, which was followed by annexation of Crimea and then military, economic, diplomatic and informational confrontation with Russian Federation. Since then, the course to the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance has become the official policy of the country.

In modern Ukraine, there are a number of reforms that must be implemented urgently. People are waiting for changes in the areas of justice, security, economics, and health care. These are serious problems requiring an urgent solution, because this is why thousands of people leave Ukraine every year, and those who remain feel uncertain and vulnerable.

In May 2016, the Research & Branding Group measured the level of life-satisfaction in Ukraine. The main “disaster factors” for not-too-happy Ukrainians are the uncertainty of tomorrow (36%), poverty or lack of money (34%), and health problems (18%). The survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology proves it too. It is notable that Ukrainians are much happier with their well-being than with the life of the country. They estimate their individual well-being at 6 points, while the welfare of the country – at -46, which is less than in prewar years.

This research describes the areas that will have the greatest result in the medium and long term. They will contribute to increased resistance to both external attacks and internal destabilization.

Only a strong civil society aware of the value of democracy, its achievements, able to think critically and identify itself with this country can resist populism, hostile disinformation, and incitement to hatred.

Next will be given the directions of the country’s policy, which will contribute to the democratization of Ukrainian society, removal of social tension and hence better “adoption” of reforms, will further European integration.
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY ON CIVIC PRINCIPLE INSTEAD OF ETHNIC

Context

The history of modern Ukraine demonstrates that the biggest spikes in the development of civil society took place after the revolutions: in 2004 (Orange Revolution), and in 2014 (the Revolution of Dignity). In both cases, representatives of various national, social, and age groups took to the streets to fight against the arbitrary nature of the authorities and injustice. Both times, people rallied around their shared values and ideals rather than around language, beliefs, or belonging to a particular nationality.

The Revolution of Dignity was especially illustrative. Many Ukrainians, Tatars, Jews, Russians, Georgians, Moldovans, Hungarians, and other nationalities took part in it. Armenian Serhiy Nigoyan and Belarusian Mykhailo Zhyznyevskyi were the first victims killed by Berkut’s bullets. Hundreds (the Self-Defense units) were formed on various grounds: sometimes territorial, sometimes national or ideological. However, all participants in those events note a high level of cooperation, mutual respect and loyalty to each other. According to Nathan Khazin, commander of the Jewish Hundred of the Maidan, he did not see any in-tolerance over several months of the protest movement.

However, with the course of events first in Crimea and later in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Russian disinformation machine created a myth about “aggressive Banderites” who killed ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers and oppressed other nationalities. In early 2014, Russian TV channels spread stories of “atrocities” committed by Banderites. Such stories related mainly to the Maidan activists and volunteer battalions, which in the first phase of the war had been integrated neither into the Ukrainian Armed Forces nor into the National Guard.

The Russian TV channel RT even aired a bombastic fake story about Ukrainian Jews “fleeing from Kyiv” due to the outbreak of anti-Semitism.

The propagandists show rabbi Misha Kapustin who is packing and saying that he “flees for the sake of his safety and safety of his children.” Besides, the RT journalist demonstrates the anti-Semitic inscription on the synagogue doors and reports that an act of vandalism was committed in Kyiv.

In reality, Russian journalists showed a synagogue in Simferopol (Crimea) and not in Kyiv. Misha Kapustin was the main rabbi of Crimea at that time. The Rabbi was really packing his things, because he planned to escape from the Russian security forces on the peninsula, which at that moment had already captured Crimea, and not from the “new ultra-right authorities of Ukraine.”

The volunteer movement very quickly gained the support of various political forces, individual sponsors, etc. So, oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskyi, the then governor of Dnipropetrovsk region and an active member of the Jewish community in Ukraine, expressed his support to the Right Sector nationalist battalion. Besides, there were many ethnic Jews among volunteers, and that did not coincide with the image of a nationalist as an anti-Semite. Then Russian propaganda began to work in two directions. There was a narrative about anti-Semitic movements in Ukraine intended for the international community, whereas their domestic audience, especially the Russian social media, was informed about a “Jewish conspiracy in Ukraine” and “disclosure” of the Jewish roots of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman. Obviously, they expected an indignant reaction from their audience. In response, a humorous memo “Judeo-Banderites” appeared in Ukraine. That was the name used by people of Jewish origin who supported the Maidan and the struggle of Ukraine against Russia.

The radical nationalism “card” is still in Russia’s active arsenal in the informational war against Ukraine. It harms the country’s international reputation, demoralizes the population, and exacerbates the internal political struggle.

Historian Vyacheslav Likhachov, Project Manager of the Congress of National Communities of Ukraine notes that Ukraine’s peculiarity lies in the fact that ultra-rights have never enjoyed significant support. In his opinion, the role of right-wing radicals in the Revolution of Dignity was a peculiar media phenomenon, and not only as a result of Russian propaganda, but also in the Ukrainian dimension - against the background of the passivity of other political forces. The participation of
the radicals in protecting Ukraine's sovereignty shifted their perception by Ukrainian society - from radicalism to heroism.

However, Vyacheslav Likhachov notes that according to the polls, it has not been converted into electoral support yet.

The 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections are the most illustrative. The Nationalist Party "Svoboda" was not elected in the Parliament of Ukraine because it failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold for entering it. In the same year, Svoboda’s leader Oleh Tyahnybok participated in the presidential election and received only 1.16 per cent of the votes.

These figures are more than illustrative to understand the public sentiment of Ukrainians towards nationalist movements.

However, the international community continues to express concern about the "dramatic increase in anti-Semitic sentiment" in Ukraine.

Alina Polyakova, American Atlantic Council analyst (Washington), said in an interview to Radio Liberty that the Russian propaganda artificially played the "card" of "excessive power of radicals and extremists in Ukraine."

"As to the issue of extreme nationalism, Ukraine is not the country in which I would worry about it. I would be more worried about it in western countries than in Ukraine."

Besides, the survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 18 countries of Central and Eastern Europe proved that the level of anti-Semitism in Ukraine is the lowest in Europe. Only 5 per cent of Ukrainians said they would not be willing to accept Jews as their fellow citizens. In Russia, according to the document, this level is almost three times higher.

According to Vyacheslav Likhachov, neo-Nazism is just a small part of the right-wing radical spectrum. Ukrainian politician Andriy Biletskyi, leader of the National Corps party, founded in October 2016, can be considered as its representative, based on his published statements and texts. Some activists of the Azov Civil Corps public organization and members of the Ukrainian ultras groups became the core of this party.

The National Corps has a negative and skeptical attitude towards the activities of the European Union and all its institutions. The party is known for its paramilitary units (the so-called "vigilante groups" or "street army"). Their actions, in particular parades in military uniforms with military slogans in the city’s center, as well as their statements and symbols, cause a hailstorm of criticism in Ukrainian society. According to media reports, the National Corps, along with representatives of other nationalist groups, are responsible for destroying Roma camps and beating them.

Most worrying are the statements about the affiliation of the Azov and the National Corps with the state. In 2014, the Azov volunteer battalion under Biletsky’s leadership joined the National Guard of Ukraine subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs headed by Arsen Avakov.

Why is this important?

Despite the turbulent times in the country's life, it's time to reflect on what has been done correctly and what has not over the 27 years of independence. One of the biggest mistakes of the Ukrainian government was insufficient work with national communities.

One of the most striking examples is the Crimean Tatars. The territory of modern Ukraine, in particular, Crimea, is the historical home of this ethos. However, until recently, its integration into public life, as well as the interest of the rest of Ukraine to it was quite low. Support for ongoing dialogue and joint projects with Crimean Tatars, Hungarians, Jews, Rusyns, etc. would protect these communities from hostile propaganda, promote cultural experience exchange, and prevent their discontent.
Support for ongoing dialogue and joint projects with Crimean Tatars, Hungarians, Jews, Rusyns, etc. would protect these communities from hostile propaganda, promote cultural experience exchange, and prevent their discontent.
What is missing?

Although the level of loyalty to ultra-nationalist movements in Ukrainian society is extremely low, the Ukrainian authorities lack an active vocal rejection and public condemnation of such entities known for their neo-Nazi views, controversial statements, and actions. It would have given a clear signal of separation from ultra-nationalist sentiment, relieved tension in relations with international partners, and undermined all Russian propaganda attempts to create a myth about the "fascist government of Ukraine";

Elaboration of a strategy for the development of Ukraine as a political nation with the participation of representatives of national minorities. The strategy should include clear projects for implementation (art exhibitions, youth camps, festivals of national cultures, ethnic cuisines, etc.). To do this, it is necessary to create a working group based on the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Information Policy with the participation of civil society;

- A series of films/programs on Ukrainian TV channels on the participation of representatives of national minorities in important events in the life of Ukraine: World War II, Ukrainian art, Russian-Ukrainian war, etc.;
- A series of entertaining culinary programs about ethnic cuisines of Ukraine;
- Information campaign in Europe about Ukraine as a tolerant multicultural country with the participation of public opinion leaders, international journalists, experts;
- Introduction of an annual conference for launching a broad dialogue on a civic approach to nation-building with the participation of representatives of national communities.
REINTEGRATION OF CRIMEA, DONETSK AND LUHANSK REGIONS

Context

After the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas in 2014, Russian media took control of the information field in the occupied territories – Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. Those were, first of all, Russian central television channels, as well as the local media of self-proclaimed republics such as Novorossia TV, First Republic Channel, Oplot-TV. Ukrainian channels are accessible via satellite, but not everyone has such a possibility. In addition, due to complete dominance of Russian content, the overwhelming majority of people do not trust the Ukrainian media, and it is often dangerous for people in Crimea and Donbas to watch Ukrainian channels or listen to Ukrainian radio.

The frontline part of the Ukrainian government-controlled territory remains a risk zone. Some areas have no or very limited access to Ukrainian TV and radio. As a result, this vacuum is filled with Russian content. This creates a paradoxical situation: the locality can be controlled by the Ukrainian government, but Russian television provides it with information on the developments in the region.

In 2017, the Detector Media NGO studied information consumption in the Ukrainian government-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions: experts noted significant dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian media among the residents. It turned out that people in the frontline zone still prefer the Russian content. According to most respondents, the main causes are fatigue from negative news and search for positive content.

The authors of the study note: the region has a request for local news, and it is not satisfied.

“Locals often lack simple, vital, daily information. No one is providing this information - neither the government nor the media,” said Diana Dutsyk, Executive Director at Detector Media NGO.

The authors of the study have developed a number of recommendations for the media, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Among them are an expansion of positive content, greater sensitivity to the problems of the region, financing of television and radio broadcasting, and distribution of the press in the frontline territories.

The domination of Russian resources gradually leads to a slow distancing of people in Crimea, the occupied territories of Donbas and the front line from the general Ukrainian context. This distancing is primarily ideological since the Kremlin media propose completely different options to assess both international and home events, Russian-Ukrainian relations.

It is clear that Ukraine will face the greatest challenges after returning those regions. And we mean not only how people in those regions will perceive the rest of Ukraine, but also the other way around. How to avoid stigmatization, conviction, accusations from residents of territories controlled by Ukraine? And how can we raise their awareness of the pro-Western course of the country if they have been consuming anti-Western Russian propaganda for years?

That is why the issue of establishing and maintaining channels of communication with Donbas and Crimea are the priority for Ukraine today.

In Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the situation is especially encumbered by constant military actions. People are traumatized by being in the midst of conflict and often admit that the only thing they seek is peace. Unfortunately, as long as Russian occupation troops are in the territory of Donbas and bombard Ukrainian military positions almost every day, it is impossible. But the task of the government and civil society is to establish channels of communication to inform about major developments, and most importantly - give a clear signal to the inhabitants of the occupied territories that Ukraine has not abandoned them and has a clear vision of their full reintegration.

Given that the level of tension and politicization of life in Donbas and Crimea is quite high, “soft power” projects will be the most effective in this context. That is, those that will not exaggerate, politicize, or escalate current sentiments on both sides.
The domination of Russian resources gradually leads to a slow distancing of people in Crimea, the occupied territories of Donbas and the front line from the general Ukrainian context.
What has been done?

“Hromadske radio”

A non-governmental organization, which aims to create independent radio broadcasting in Ukraine.

At the end of 2014, Hromadske Radio began to produce news releases Chronicles of Donbas. The news releases were broadcast to residents of eastern regions of Ukraine on the waveband of partner radio stations, and later on their own frequencies.

In July 2015, Hromadske Radio received the opportunity to speak at five frequencies - in Kyiv and the region, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. And the radio received another five frequencies for temporary use in Donbas over the period of armed confrontation in the region.

Since the beginning of November 2015, Hromadske Radio has been releasing a daily two-hour talk show Kyiv-Donbas, intended for Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Two two-hour programs in Russian present the most topical events in Donetsk and Luhansk regions and are addressed to all those who want to know more about the situation in the east of the country. Hromadske Radio broadcasts 24 hours a day, of which five hours are in Russian.

The structure of Hromadske Radio includes evacuated former regional Luhansk and Donetsk radio.

The main source of funding for Hromadske Radio is donations from institutions and private donations. In addition, Hromadske Radio collects funds with the help of crowdfunding platforms.

Army FM

It is a military radio station of Ukraine, initiated by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and funded by a Charity organization “Spirit of America” and Ukrainian MoD. Its target audience is Ukrainian soldiers in the ATO zone. They provide information on the activities of the Ukrainian Army, discuss the needs of military servicemen in the ATO zone, present news, give legal advice to the military, and tell amazing stories about fighters and their commanders.

The staff of the radio station consists of professional military, journalists and volunteers.

“Donbas. Realities” and “Crimea. Realities”

These are television projects of the Ukrainian service of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty.

Donbas. Realities offers exclusive facts about Donbas, the lives of the “LPR” and “DPR”, delivery of weapons, profiles of militants, Russian military personnel, foreign mercenaries, and investigates evidence of Russia’s participation in the war in eastern Ukraine.

Crimea. Realities are broadcast on a weekly basis on the international television channel Nastoyashcheye-Vremya. In September 2015, the Crimea Realities team with the assistance of the Ukrainian Radio launched Radio Crimea. Realities, broadcasting on the medium waveband to a greater part of Crimea, southeast of Ukraine, and the foothill areas of the North Caucasus, Russia.

Crimea SOS

The CrimeaSOS Social Organization, whose activities are aimed at highlighting the illegality of the Crimean occupation and Russian repressive policy towards the Crimeans, maintaining ties between the peninsula and mainland Ukraine, as well as consolidating the Ukrainian society through the protection of rights, freedoms, and interests of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other people who were affected by the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

CrimeaSOS was created by volunteers as a Facebook page on the first day of the Russian occupation of the peninsula - February 27, 2014 - to provide timely and reliable information on the situation in Crimea. Subsequently, the scope of the project has expanded. Today, it provides emergency assistance to internally displaced persons, advocates the return of Crimea at the national and international levels, monitors violations of human rights in Crimea, and coordinates social movements and initiatives on internally displaced persons.

ATP TV Channel

It is a Ukrainian TV Channel whose target audience is Crimean Tatars. It was broadcasting in Crimea from 1 September 2006 until 1 April 2015 when it was forced to shut down by occupying Russian authorities after failing to register under Russian law. In mid-June 2015 the channel resumed its broadcasting in mainland Ukraine and has since then been located in Kyiv. When located in Crimea most of the channel’s programs were in Russian (60%) with 35% in Crimean Tatar and 5% in Ukrainian.
What is missing?

- Development of a strategy for economic reintegration of Donbas and Crimea
- Development of a strategy for cultural reintegration of Donbas and Crimea
- Support to the existing and creation of new media for residents of the front-line area to cover local events, explain European integration reforms, and debunk myths about the war
- Art uniting projects: exhibitions of Ukrainian artists, artistic interventions, and cinema weeks in the cities of Eastern Ukraine, etc.
- Dialogue cultural, historical, artistic programs
- Training for regional journalists: how to cover events in military areas
- Informing young people living in the occupied/annexed territories about opportunities in education, social benefits in Ukraine (production of videos, brochures, telephone applications).
WORK WITH HISTORICAL MEMORY

Context

In 1991 Ukraine broke away from the Soviet Union and became an independent country. However, despite its formal independence, from 1991 up to the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine continued to be in the Kremlin sphere of influence and strategic interests. The common Soviet past came at a price. Language, culture, and perception of history are those phenomena that continued to unite a significant part of Ukrainians with Russia.

In Soviet times, the struggle of Ukrainians for their identity, for independence was several times suppressed with savagery. Here are just a few episodes from the history of the Ukrainian liberation movement:

- 1917 – 1920: the Bolsheviks destroyed the Ukrainian People’s Republic by using military forces,
- Stalinist repressions of the 1930s. The genocide of the Ukrainian peasantry, ethnic cleansing, mass deportation, dispossession, and execution of “enemies of the people”
- 1939-1950: the Soviet Union suppresses the Ukrainian insurgent movement
- 1960-1970s: deportations to concentration camps, represions against a whole wave of Ukrainian dissidents: writers, poets, social and human rights activists

Formally, it was a union of different republics, which were allegedly part of the USSR on their own accord. In practice, any movement toward national self-awareness had to be stopped. The intellectual elite, which promoted the Ukrainian language, culture, and history was always the key target.

One of the main tasks was to conceal information on the liberation struggle from new generations, which is why history textbooks were rewritten in obedience to the political line of the Communist Party.

Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1991 part of the young democratic state of Ukraine continued to be in a common cultural, linguistic, and generally ideological field with Russia.

After the collapse of the empire, Russia continued to aggressively promote its Russian-centric narrative in the former USSR countries. So, until the Revolution of Dignity, when President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, part of the Ukrainian population was still nostalgic about the Soviet Union.

According to 2013 polls of the Rating Sociological Group, 41% of Ukrainians regretted the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2010, there were 46% of them. According to the polls, each time the biggest supporters of the USSR were elderly people, but there were other dependencies: Russian-speaking respondents and Russians regretted more than Ukrainians. It was also observed that the higher education, the less nostalgia.

This proves the unconditional effectiveness of both Soviet propaganda in the times of the USSR and Russian propaganda in recent decades.

It is through a historical narrative that modern Russia actively propagates an idea of the “Russian world”. This concept became extremely popular after being presented by Vladimir Putin in 2006.

_The Russian world can and should unite everyone to whom the Russian word and Russian culture is dear, no matter where they live, in Russia or abroad. Use this phrase as often as you can - “Russian world”._

- V.V. Putin, 2006

In 2014, protecting the “Russian world” and Russian-speaking people became a pretext for the annexation of Crimea and military intervention in the eastern part of Ukraine. Preparation for invading these regions was

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1 https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Русский_мир
carried out long before the Maidan. Statements by high political figures in Russia that "Ukraine is not a state", "Ukrainians and Russians are one people", "Russia is Ukraine's elder brother", etc., were heard from the middle of the 2000s. They were actively supported by Russian television, music, and artistic content on the subject.

For example, before 2015, Ukrainian TV channels broadcast a lot of films, serials, documentary and humorous programs that aggrandized the USSR, spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda, heroized Russian law-enforcement agencies, imposed an idea of historical affinity between the two peoples, and ridiculed heroes of the Ukrainian epic.

What has been done?

The opening of the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine

In 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a package of laws within the framework of general de-communization. One of the laws was the Law on Access to Archives of Repressive Bodies of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of 1917–1991. It provided access to information on inhuman crimes of the USSR to everyone interested, and especially to those who had long dreamed of knowing something about their repressed relatives.

These are different records, reports, special notifications, agent developments, personal and operational records of agents, plans of Chekist military operations, investigative and criminal cases, control and supervision cases, deportation cases, personal cases of repressive workers, Tribunal sentences, resolutions of special meetings, NKVD troika and the like.

In October 2018, according to the Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) ³, Ukraine ranked first with a rate of 70.11% in the overall assessment of access to the KGB archives among post-Soviet countries.

At present, work is underway to create an archive of the Institute of National Remembrance, to which KGB documents from SBU archives will be transferred.

“This is a necessary stage of the reform, which will make political influence on access to archival information impossible and deprive the security forces of extrinsic work,” said Head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance Volodymyr Viatrovych.

Foundation of the Institute of National Remembrance⁴

This research institution, whose goal is to restore and preserve the memory of the Ukrainian people, was founded in 2006. However, it was possible to fully accomplish its task only after the Revolution of Dignity.

Some of the most successful INR projects include:

- changing the concept of celebrating commemorative dates. They initiated to reconsider Soviet holidays, in particular, to stop celebrating May 9 as the Day of Victory of the Soviet people, and instead, make it the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation.

- The World War II project on unknown facts of participation of Ukrainians in the largest armed conflict in the history of mankind and debunking of Soviet myths.

- The Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921. Historic coverage of the Ukrainian liberation movement

- Holodomor as a genocide of the Ukrainian people. Clarification of the Stalinist regime crimes in 1932-33.

Insufficient funding prevents the Institute of National Remembrance from conducting large-scale awareness campaigns around the country. That is why a number of its decisions remain unknown or unintelligible to the general public, which often leads to manipulations about the Institute’s activities on the part of Russian propaganda.

Prohibition of Russian content, glorifying Russian security agencies

In 2014, the top 10 Ukrainian TV channels showed over 27,000 hours of serials, of which 66% were of Russian production, 5% - Ukrainian, and 6% - joint Russian-Ukrainian production. This is proved by the study of the Ukrainian TV airtime structure in 2014, conducted by Media Resources Management (MRM). Public activists

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³ https://idfi.ge/en
⁴ http://www.memory.gov.ua/
monitored Ukrainian television on September 1 – 7, 2014. According to their data, 10 leading Ukrainian TV channels (Ukraine, ICTV, NTN, Novyi Kanal, Inter, STB, 2+2, TET, K1, 1+1) showed 71 Russian films or TV series during those days. According to the initiative group, that content was mostly of very poor quality and very often contained hostile anti-Ukrainian propaganda.5

In February 2015, under the pressure of civil society, the Parliament passed Law No.1317, according to which any distribution (showing) in Ukraine of any films (audiovisual works) that contain popularization, campaigning, propaganda, etc. of any act of law enforcement agencies, armed forces, or other armed, military, or security units of the occupying power should be prohibited. In April 2015, the law came into force.

"The situation when, under the current conditions, Ukrainian TV channels buy serials shot at the orders of the Russian Ministry of Defense because they are cheaper is abnormal," said Victoria Syumar, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy.6

Attempts of the state to comprehend the historical past and open access to it were supported by civil society.

Examples of successful historical memory initiatives:

Maidan Museum7

In the revolutionary winter of 2013-2014, a group of like-minded people, who understood the historical scale and social significance of events, called for the preservation of unique testimony for the descendants and started collecting work on barricades and educational - in the media space. This led to launching the Maidan Museum initiative in January 2014, which later merged with the Museum of Freedom initiative.

Maidan Museum/Museum of Freedom collects artefacts and testimonies, ensures preservation, research and popularization of objects, things and places associated with the Maidan. At different stages, various public figures and state institutions joined the initiative. Families of the Heavenly Hundred and the Maidan victims were involved in memorializing events of the Revolution of Dignity.

An official launch of the Museum of the Revolution of Dignity, which will be a platform for reflections on the theme of freedom and comprehension of large-scale historical processes, is scheduled for 2019. The museum will preserve the memory of the events, participants and consequences of the Revolution of Dignity, the Orange Revolution, the Granite Revolution, events associated with the struggle of Ukrainians for human rights and freedoms, freedom as a value, Ukraine’s independence, and its civilized choice.

The Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center8

This is a nonprofit educational institution that documents and commemorates the Holocaust, in particular, mass executions in Babi Yar in Kyiv in September 1941.

The Babi Yar conducts educational campaigns, carries out scientific and archival work, and collects eyewitness accounts.

The goal of the center is to commemorate all victims of the tragedy, set up a research center based on the project, specializing in Holocaust and other crimes committed on the territories of Ukraine, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and develop an educational platform aimed at stimulating a comprehensive understanding of the Babi Yar tragedy and provide the public with tools for work with the Holocaust.

The construction and opening of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center are planned for 2020-2023. For this purpose, the institution launches a fundraising campaign in 2019.

Ukraine Crisis Media Center’s campaign9

In 2015, Ukraine Crisis Media Center together with the Institute of National Remembrance and the Presidential Administration conducted a large-scale communication campaign to change the perception of World War II in the minds of Ukrainians. About 7 million Ukrainians

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5 https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%88%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9_%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8F_%D0%BC%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BD
6 https://www.5.ua/ukrayina/sumar-rosiiski-xerylja-pro-miliciu-ta-rosisky-armjiu-ce-nenormalno-68465.html
7 http://www.maidanmuseum.org/
8 http://babynyar.org/
9 http://texty.org.ua/pg/news/editorial/read/59761/Pamjatajemo_Peremagajemo__rolyky_pro_Ukrajinu_v
were killed in the Second World War, which is 40-44% in relation to the total losses of the USSR.

It was proposed to use the red poppy flower as a symbol of remembrance of the victims of the war, and quietly commemorate the victims instead of conducting loud celebrations.

**Online media “Istorychna Pravda” (Historical Truth)**

“Istorychna Pravda” is an online social and historical, popular science media outlet founded by Ukrainian journalists and historians in 2010.

The team writes mainly about the history of Ukraine and Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Jews, Crimean Tatars, and other nations whose fate is closely linked with Ukraine, from ancient times to the present. However, it focuses on the political history of the twentieth century: the struggle for statehood, human rights, scientific and technological progress, totalitarian projects and experiments, people’s fates.

This is a convenient and accessible format for all who are interested in history. Besides, “Istorychna Pravda” is a platform for scholarly and journalistic discussions on historical politics and politics of memory. They appeal to readers, encouraging them to scan family archives, write family histories, delve into the genealogy, the history of their city, village, and native land.

However, due to lack of funding, “Istorychna Pravda” cannot afford to frequently update information on its web page, attract more authors or promote itself online.

**Why is this important?**

Work with historical memory could be Ukraine’s homework for the years ahead if it weren’t for the Russian aggression. It is distorted historical narratives that are actively used by the Kremlin in the information war against Ukraine.

This is how the Kremlin whips up the myth that Ukrainians were mass-scale Nazi collaborators in World War II, that Crimea never belonged to Ukraine, or that the Ukrainian statehood is artificial.

However, the most important thing is that in this way the state can mobilize its population against another state within a fairly short time.

According to the Russian sociological agency Levada Center, Ukraine has been enemy number two for Russian citizens for several years in a row. Their number one enemy is the United States.

This means that something like this can happen not only to Ukraine, but also to other countries with Russian-speaking minorities to whom Russian propaganda appeals.

With the acquisition of subjectivity as a state, Ukraine must have an adult responsible view of its history. This implies not only publication of unknown facts from the history of the people, but also a rejection of victimhood, avoidance of politicization of historical themes, and the beginning of a thorough dialogue on contradictory chapters of history, their analysis and recognition of the people’s responsibility for certain historical events. In this sense, the policy of reconciliation introduced by the presidents of Ukraine and Poland, Leonid Kuchma and Aleksander Kwaśniewski in the 1990s is illustrative. “We forgive you and beg your forgiveness,” the two states said to each other. If a country can learn lessons from its own mistakes and failures, it becomes stronger. Concealment and denial lead to the inability to assess not only past events, but also modern challenges.

Thus, if Ukrainians learn to work with their own past and elaborate a thorough policy of national memory, this will become a basis not only for coming to an understanding with each other, but also will equip the population to counter misinformation and will set a good example to other states.

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11 [https://www.levada.ru/2018/06/14/druzya-i-vragi-rossii-3/](https://www.levada.ru/2018/06/14/druzya-i-vragi-rossii-3/)
12 [https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1578597-kvasnevskij-i-kuchma-zrobili-spilnu-zayavu-shchodo-volinskoyi-tragediyi](https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1578597-kvasnevskij-i-kuchma-zrobili-spilnu-zayavu-shchodo-volinskoyi-tragediyi)
What is missing?

- Digitization of archives, creation of a National digital archive
- A thorough dialogue on controversial and contradictory events of the past. Recognition of the people's mistakes. Beginning a broad discourse with the international historic community.
- Information campaigns on debunking the Soviet myths about the Ukrainian liberation movement
- Creation of the Holocaust Memorial
- Periodic conferences/seminars with the involvement of international historians so that events of the Ukrainian past become part of a broad discourse in European history.
- Historical films/TV series
- Creation of the Crimean Tatars History Museum
PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR THE MOST TRAUMATIZED GROUPS OF THE POPULATION

Context

Everyone who has been following the events in Ukraine over the last 5 years understands the psychological state of its people. Maidan, deaths of the Heavenly Hundred heroes, the annexation of Crimea, the war, more than 11,000 dead, and constant information attacks are a brief list of the traumas Ukraine is trying to cope with. This is difficult because the war in the East continues, news about deaths of the military comes almost every day, the wounded return, there are attacks on public activists, and economic changes are slower than we expected. These factors hold the society tense, which leads to fatigue and nervous disorders.

The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine states that 1.2 million Ukrainians (more than 3% of the total population) suffer from mental disorders, and this figure is increasing year by year. Ukraine ranks first in the number of mental disorders in Europe.

According to WHO forecasts, by 2020, mental disorders will be among the top five diseases causing significant human losses.

The most vulnerable groups include:

- Military, combatants, veterans. People who were in the area of hostilities are four times as likely to have posttraumatic syndrome and mental disorders as other people. According to the Research Center for Humanitarian Problems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 80% of ATO fighters received psychological traumas over three years of the war, one third of them need psychiatric care.

- Their families who stayed at home, watched, made telephone calls, emotionally involved in everything that was happening

- Internally displaced persons

- Volunteers, civic activists

- Children and teens

- The elderly

In addition, poor mental health in Ukraine is closely linked to poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. Stigmatization, exclusion, discrimination, and negative reaction of the family or community are also the consequences of mental health disorders. Ukraine has one of the highest suicide rates in the world - from 24 to 32 per 100,000 people.

Of all the above categories, only veterans, and combatants receive fairly substantial help. More than 300,000 troops have participated in the Anti-Terrorist Operations in the East of Ukraine since 2014. More than 160,000 have already returned home. They could receive psychological help due to internal resources of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as through the support of many NATO countries that continue to take Ukrainian military for rehabilitation, and also by efforts of civic organizations.

One of the best and most conspicuous examples is the work of the Pobratymy organization. It was set up in 2015 to support Ukrainian servicemen who return to civilian life after participating in the ATO. The authors of the rehab program, together with highly skilled specialists, are introducing the Equal to Equal approach of mutual support among veterans, which is innovative in Ukraine, but quite usual in the world. The training is aimed at working with the consequences of psychological injuries received during hostilities. Veterans are taught to help their comrades in arms and work with their own unique experiences.

There are many other different programs intended for psychological rehabilitation of military and veterans. However, psychologists warn that this should be not a one-time help only, because in 75% of cases the posttraumatic syndrome tends to manifest itself again. The experience of the United States of America in this context is illustrative. According to the American Strategic Research Center RAND, 20% of veterans of large-scale military conflicts (the Vietnam War, the war in Iraq) are prone to depression and posttraumatic stress disorder. Among the examples that have not yet been implemented in Ukraine is the integration of animal therapy, in particular, hippotherapy, into the work of specialized military hospitals at the US Department of Veterans Affairs within the framework of the Horses for
Heroes program. This rehabilitation program for the US military became a nationwide mechanism.

Particularly important is assistance to civic activists. Recently, the number of attacks on them has increased in Ukraine. The most resonant is the murder of Kateryna Handzyuk, a Kherson activist who fought against the arbitrariness of law enforcement agencies in her region. In July, she was attacked with sulfuric acid. Doctors were struggling to save her life for four months, but Kateryna did not survive. She died at the beginning of November 2018. Despite public pressure, the police still have not identified those who ordered the murder. Many activists admit that they are working under constant threats and pressure. This inflicts a sense of tension and anxiety on them, affecting both their work and personal life.

What has been done?

- A preliminary model of mental health in Ukraine for the period of 2017 - 2030 was developed through the OneHealth Tool program. The cost of treatment of selected priority mental illnesses - depression, anxiety disorder, alcoholism, bipolar and psychotic disorders was calculated.

- The Concept of the National Mental Health Care Program in Ukraine for the period up to 2030 was approved.

The modern Ukrainian system of mental health care as a whole has inherited the organizational structure, as well as the strategies and practices of the Soviet system. This system has not undergone significant structural changes since Ukraine gained independence. Consequently, the Concept envisages a number of changes in approaches and methods, as well as an active coverage of this problem in the media, public awareness raising, regional work, professional development, and involvement of civic organizations. The expected results include:

- The Ministry of Healthcare considers the possibility of establishing a National Mental Health Center.

What is missing?

- Support for projects of the Ministry of Healthcare of Ukraine. The healthcare reform is currently one of the most successful. It faces a great deal of resistance at the local level where long-standing corrupt schemes operate, and doctors often do not benefit from innovative approaches. The Ministry of Healthcare has already launched a series of reforms in this area and is open to cooperation with civil society. The National Mental Health Center as one of the critical projects for the country could be an example of such cooperation;

- rehabilitation programs for volunteers and activists not only in big cities, but also in small towns and villages;

- Rehabilitation programs for servicemen’s children: camps, animal therapy;

- Psychotherapeutic cultural, educational programs for front-line inhabitants;

- Programs for treatment of alcohol dependence of people with a posttraumatic syndrome;

- Creating phone applications: how to deal with panic attacks and nervous breakdowns;

- Work with mass media: how not to be an instrument of psychological attack;

- Information campaigns, television projects on war veterans and their families - to increase people’s tolerance to them.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ELITE OF UKRAINE

Context

Currently, the political elite in Ukraine is a mixture of old power representatives who earned their fortunes in the turbulent 90s, often in a dishonest and illegal way, and a new generation of people from NGOs, journalism, and business.

The former have extensive experience in Ukrainian politics and resources (financial, human, administrative, etc.). The latter have the support of international partners and an active, thoughtful part of society. In 2014, it seemed that openness, honesty, and integrity of new politicians would win a victory over "pre-Maidan" power representatives. However, this confrontation still persists.

The most striking example of an "old school" of the Ukrainian political elite is the activities of Ukrainian politician, oligarch, and representative of Putin’s interests Viktor Medvedchuk. Mr. Medvedchuk has long been in Ukrainian politics. At one time, he was called President Kuchma’s “gray cardinal.” He is known for his involvement in the tragic history of Ukrainian dissident and poet Vasyl Stus in the ’80s, as well as for proximity, even family ties with Vladimir Putin, who baptized Medvedchuk’s child several years ago.

Viktor Medvedchuk was a lawyer of Vasyl Stus. However, during the trial he violated the lawyer’s ethics, having acknowledged the guilt of his client for him. As a result, the well-known Ukrainian poet and human rights defender was sentenced to 10 years of forced labor and 5 years of expulsion, where he was eventually tortured to death.

After the RF’s military aggression against Ukraine, the politician supported Russia’s side. He advocates federalization of Ukraine and does not recognize Russia as a party to the conflict. Besides, he is dead set against the pro-Western course of the country. Medvedchuk is the leader of the Ukrainian Choice party, which plans to participate in the upcoming parliamentary election.

And in order to prepare public opinion for the election, Viktor Medvedchuk, according to the media, has recently bought two TV channels in Ukraine - 112 and News One. This has immediately affected the content of those media. In their broadcasts, pro-Russian politicians, members of the former Party of Regions (whose leader was Viktor Yanukovych) are actively appearing with criticism of the European integration reforms, modernization of the army, healthcare sector, etc.

This is just one example of the methods used by some of the old political circles in Ukraine. There are many similar examples at different levels of political life.

Ukrainian society underwent the bitter experience of the Orange Revolution in 2004, when it was generally believed that for tectonic changes to occur in the country it would be enough to just replace high-ranking officials. This appeared not to be enough. That is why the Orange Revolution outcomes disappointed all its participants. During the Revolution of Dignity, it became clear that to avoid a repeat of the old scenario, numerous agents of changes, people with truly democratic values are needed. As a result of the revolution of 2014, many activists have emerged who are showing leadership qualities and willingness to take responsibility for the country. A new elite began to appear, different from the discredited hidebound circle in power. So, it quickly became clear that for real changes, the new people are needed: with modern education, fair-mindedness, and a new vision of the country’s development.

Open University of Maidan was one of the first initiatives in this area. In December 2013, practically simultaneously, several communities of Kyiv business schools came up with an idea of teaching people who united during the revolution. The Kyiv School of Economics and the initiative "Nezly Maidan" organized several lectures in the open air and in underground passages of Maidan. At the same time, the ASPEN community delivered lectures at the Parliamentary Library. Kyiv-Mohyla Business School decided to launch a University format on Maidan, and two graduates volunteered to launch this project.

After a few days, the stage was set up and on December 10, the first lectures were delivered. Within a single month, teachers and scientists delivered 295 free lectures. The Open University of Maidan was recognized as one of the 10 best social projects in 2013.
For real changes, the new people are needed: with modern education, fair-mindedness, and a new vision of the country’s development.
Ukraine. One of them is education. Classical education in Ukraine requires changes. It is characterized by low-mobility, low-technology, and obsolete approaches. Besides, it is taken out the global context, which is a cause of regular big scandals. Although its reformation has been started, the process is very long.

That is why alternative private educational projects started to appear - schools, programs, and universities whose purpose is to develop young leaders and to involve them in public life.

What has been done?

Open University of Reforms

The joint educational project of the Center for Democracy and Rule of Law and the Reanimation Package of Re-forms. It is an educational project for professional training and the formation of young initiative reformers. Education at the Open University of Reforms is conducted in the form of lectures, training, discussions, master classes from leading RPD experts, famous journalists, public figures, diplomats, and government officials.

Project participants also undergo training in leading non-governmental organizations and expert centers.

The Ukrainian Leadership Academy

is a 10-month educational development program for school leavers aged 16 to 18. The program helps young people find their callings, learn about the country and the world, consciously choose a future career, and expose their leadership skills.

Studies are based on three elements of development: physical, emotional, and intellectual.

While studying and working, students acquire skills of self-discovery, analysis of social challenges, teamwork, and communication in order to better understand themselves, the country, and the world we live in. Studies are free for students. Everyone who successfully passes a selection obtains a grant covering accommodation, meals, expeditions, health insurance, etc.

The Ukrainian Leadership Academy (UAL) was modelled on an Israeli "Mechina," a program of training young leaders, launched in this country more than 20 years ago. The Israeli Leadership Academies were based on 600-year experience of English education programs of Oxford and Cambridge. They trained a new generation of leaders who were ready to serve their country. Israeli Mechinot were both successful and popular, and eventually turned into a net-work of 60 academies throughout the country.

The Ukrainian Leadership Academy was established in 2015 with the support of the team of the Western NIS Enterprise Fund. The first branch of the Ukrainian Academy of Leadership was opened in Kyiv in September 2015. In 2016, four more branches were opened: in Lviv, Poltava, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv.

Ukrainian Catholic University

It is an open academic community that is based on the Eastern Christian tradition and sees its mission in educating leaders, professionals for service in Ukraine and abroad.

The University’s development strategy envisages in the medium-term strategic perspective the visible presence and recognition of the University as a leading research center at the national level and, in some areas, in the international global space as well.

UCU has a modern approach to teaching; international scholars, researchers, and experts often visit the University to give their lectures.

What is missing?

- Programs for learning foreign languages for schoolchildren and students in the regions
- Leadership programs for activists of student centers
- Support for student scholarly communities
- Private schools, kindergartens, and universities in the eastern part of Ukraine
- Programs for informing young people about opportunities to study abroad
- Art projects - lectures by leading Ukrainian artists in state universities of Ukraine.