RUSSIA'S INFORMATION WAR IN CENTRAL EUROPE:
NEW TRENDS AND COUNTER-MEASURES

by Milan Šuplata and Milan Nič, GLOBSEC Policy Institute

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The main purpose of Russia's information campaign, as part of hybrid warfare, is to undermine its opponents. Rather than promoting Russia itself, it seeks to achieve gradual decomposition of the institutional framework and security architecture of Europe. The key targets of the Kremlin's divide et impera strategy in Central Europe have been the EU and NATO, as well as the United States. At the same time, the mass influx of disinformation on often serves Russia directly, presenting it in a positive light at the local level, sometimes even depicting it in the role of the only rational actor, unrecognized or misunderstood peacemaker and saviour.

Russia has managed to exploit our vulnerabilities because it understands and craftily uses the power of the Internet. The revolution in communication technologies, decentralization of information flows, and high penetration of the Internet have allowed Russia to bypass traditional media and have direct influence on public opinion in countries of interest.

Myriads of propaganda Facebook pages and websites in local languages emerged during the 2014-2015 period, in the wake of the violent land-grab of Ukrainian territory and later during the EU's migration crisis. Moreover, professional trolls and true believers disabled Internet discussions by flooding them with their comments and emotive visual content.

The analogy of an autoimmune disease is useful in understanding what is happening in Europe. The symptoms include negative emotions (mistrust, disgust, and anger) towards our own allies, institutions, governments and values; exaggerated fears from new threats (such as uncontrolled mass migration, the alleged Islamisation of Europe, or provoked conflict with Russia).

All this is designed to create the perception that these sentiments are largely shared by vast groups of the local population (due to the overwhelming quantity of their online communication) and parts of their political elite.

This paper follows up on the work of a group of foreign & security policy and social media analysts from the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, who have been monitoring and jointly reporting on anti-West propaganda in their national environments since Fall 2015[1]. It also shows the results of the opinion polls commissioned by the GLOBSEC Policy Institute in the framework of the same project

In Part One, the report summarizes the main narratives of current anti-West propaganda, providing insight on their effect. Part Two consists of recommended counter-measures and solutions to be undertaken at both national and international levels.

Many of these recommendations are based on numerous debates within the international consortium composed of the GLOBSEC Policy Institute, the European Values think tank, Political Capital, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and other organizations and individuals involved in the emerging regional network and exchange of experience in the field of countering anti-Western propaganda in Central Europe.

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[1] GLOBSEC Policy Institute (formerly as CEPI) based in Bratislava, Slovakia has been publishing a regular Information War Monitor for Central Europe since October 2015 in cooperation with the Czech think-tank European Values and its Hungarian partner Political Capital, and with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy.

PART ONE

1. EU AND NATO: THE NEMESES OF EUROPEAN NATIONS

The European Union has been the primary target of Russia's propaganda since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine: Brussels was blamed for orchestrating a *coup d'état* in a neighbouring state after failing to impose an unfavourable association agreement. However, it was not until the migration crisis that the information campaign against the 28-member state block became an undeclared information war. The inability of the EU and its constituents to agree on and implement quick and effective solutions to the mass influx of people from war zones and underdeveloped regions provided the adversary with a great deal of ammunition. Since then, a multitude of complementary narratives on topics such as Brexit, TTIP, the Greek debt crisis, Schengen, and migrant relocation have been employed in the anti-EU campaign.

The message has been twofold. On the one hand, the European Union has been too weak in protecting its societies from a threat (especially when it comes to Muslim immigration), and too liberal in cultural issues (mainly with respect to gay rights). On the other hand, the EU has been criticized for transforming itself into a federal super-state (the United States of Europe), destroying nation states and depriving them of sovereignty, or even becoming an undemocratic totalitarian state, a step towards global rule (New World Order). The dictate of Brussels has become one of the most popular buzzwords in public discourse, and the doubts about the value of the EU membership have been spread systematically. In the Czech Republic, calls for a British-like referendum have been backed even by President Miloš Zeman.

The United States has played an important role in the anti-EU narrative: it is said to be easier for them to control one EU than 28 single governments. Some plot lines even suggest that the EU was designed by the CIA and former Nazis in the late 1940s. Decades later, President Obama's open support for the British remaining in the EU was widely criticised as an attempt to retain control of the EU via its close ally. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the U.S. is presented as beneficial only to American corporations and detrimental to Europe, its economy, workers, and consumers. The critics of the agreement also blame the deal for being undemocratic, agreed upon in secrecy without any public control, and forced upon Europeans against their will. Similarly, the sanctions against Russia have been widely criticised in the pro-Kremlin outlets, suggesting that the US companies are benefiting from them while European countries struggles economically and the EU therefore acts contrary to its citizens' interests.

The second most important target has been the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, under constant attack at least since President Putin's famous speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 and his war with Georgia in 2008. The crisis in Ukraine and NATO's subsequent reassurance and adaptation measures on the eastern flank unleashed the beast. And again, anti-Americanism lies at the centre of the anti-NATO narrative. The U.S. is allegedly using NATO to subordinate and impose its will upon European nations, to decide NATO's policies on its own and let others obey their orders, all in pursuit of a secret master-plan to push back, encircle, and crush Russia militarily (in order to seize its immense natural resources and eliminate the last power-competitor of the United States on the global scene). This plan is facilitated by corrupt traitors, including politicians, think-tankers, and journalists who act on their behalf.

The propagandists make sure people understand that NATO's expansion is endangering Russia, as is the plan to build its ballistic missile defence. Allegedly, the new missile shield's purpose is not only to neutralize the Russian nuclear arsenal (and limit its deterrence capability), but also to secretly deploy American Tomahawk cruise missiles tipped with nuclear warheads in Russia's immediate neighbourhood, thus breaking the bilateral agreement and destroying the delicate power balance between the two competitors. The intensity of allegations has increased since the Ukraine crisis and the subsequent NATO summit in Wales, where the allies agreed upon reassurance measures (Readiness Action Plan). Since then a number of measures improving the ability to deter and defend allies in the East have been adopted or announced. All of them – and foremost the increase of allied presence in this region – have been targeted as aggressive, dangerous, and a threat to the sovereignty of host nations (the American forces are usually depicted as occupiers).

The narrative of an aggressive NATO endangering Russia and pushing it into a corner is not without purpose, These allegations of 'warmongering' will inevitably lead (intentionally or by misunderstanding) to full-fledged war, resulting in the (perhaps nuclear) destruction of NATO member states, especially those on the periphery that serve as a buffer zone for the United States. Russia has repeatedly suggested that the NATO installations, especially the missile defence sites, would be the primary targets of its pre-emptive attack.

Despite the fact that NATO policies are always adopted unanimously by all member countries, the propaganda often tries to present the Alliance as internally divided in order to illustrate how extreme are the positions of countries such as the United States and Turkey (a power-competitor in the Syrian conflict). Germany, which has been under constant information attack for its migration policy and role within the European Union, is usually presented as a peaceful counter-weight to the U.S. when it comes to NATO. Poland and the Baltic states, on the other hand, are presented as Russo-phobic and extremist in their defence and military policies, serving as bad examples to other countries of Central Europe.

2. MIGRATION APOCALYPSE

If the European Union and NATO (together with the archenemy, the United States) are the main targets of Russian information warfare, then the migration crisis has served as a weapon of mass destruction, incomparable with any other topic employed. Both the magnitude of the campaign and its effects on Europe's societies has been unprecedented, reaching the level of mass-hysteria.

The propaganda misuse of the migration crisis served several operational goals. It has influenced the public's perception of threat, decreased support for the EU and mainstream political parties and politicians, unleashing centrifugal powers across the continent (and adjacent islands), increased the support for extreme-right groups and national solutions (or even local, such as self-defence militias) rather than common European ones. It was also a needed distraction from the crisis in Ukraine, ending the period of negative reporting on Russia's aggression and thus decreasing pressure on Russia, a country squeezed by low oil prices, sanctions, and inherent economic problems. Russia also used this opportunity to de-securitize and promote itself as an acceptable partner in fighting terrorism/ISIL and stabilizing Syria (thus decreasing the flow of migrants).

The anti-migration narrative was strong because it managed to identify a threat, as well as clearly and comprehensibly differentiate on the friend/foe spectrum. The threat presented and inflated by the propaganda machine encompasses immigrants (refugees), Islam and the Islamisation of Europe (European Caliphate by 2050), terrorism committed by immigrants (Muslims), other (often violent and sexual) criminality committed by immigrants (Muslims), collapse of the welfare state due to the high cost of immigration (such as social benefits, job loss, or even the migrants' dissipated lifestyle paid for by European taxpayers), disintegration of the true (ethnically and religiously identified) society and culture, or even the annihilation of the original population. The propaganda campaign evidently aimed to incite fear and anger among the masses, and it was effective in doing so.

The success of this campaign also lies in its ability to target all relevant subjects at once, including the EU (Brussels), Germany (Chancellor Merkel), NATO and the U.S. (CIA), law-enforcement agencies (police, secret services), Turkey (President Erdogan), Israel (Mossad, Zionists), mainstream media, activists and NGOs (labelled foreign agents or human rights fanatics), public figures warning of fear and xenophobia (Slovak President Kiska), and key Western values such as democracy, liberalism, and human rights. The migration crisis was also an opportunity to spread the wildest conspiracy theories based on the secret plot of the U.S./EU/Israel/Illuminati designed to destroy European states (Kalergi plan). On the other hand, Russia (President Putin), extreme-right groups, Eurosceptic parties and partially even some EU governments and politicians have been portrayed as friendly and able to provide peace and security in this turmoil.

The propaganda activity peaked on several occasions, such as the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks, or the assaults against women in Cologne. In addition to the main line of messaging – stressing the role of mass immigration on these tragedies – some propaganda outputs spread rumours about the role of Western secret services (U.S., European, Israeli) and depicted these events as false flag operations executed in order to establish a police state in Europe. The German police was extensively blamed for systematically covering up the criminality of migrants. Moreover, the Russian media and local proxies released and spread the fake story of the gang-raped schoolgirl Lisa who lived in Germany, but was of Russian origin. Although it was later proved untrue, the story was misused by the Russian foreign minister Lavrov at a press conference, worsening German-Russian relations and serving as a wake-up call for German security services. In general, while anti-NATO narratives have been to a large extent based on anti-Americanism, the attack against the EU has been channelled through anti-German and anti-Merkel sentiments.

3. ENCHANTING THE HEARTS AND MINDS

Although Russia has not been able to win the hearts and minds of the people, it has managed to enchant them, ensuring that they are confused and frustrated, and filled with negative emotions towards their own values and institutions. To map the effects of the propaganda campaign on public perception, the GLOBSEC Policy Institute commissioned a series of opinion polls in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia.

The Slovak results show that support for a pro-Russian (Eastern) orientation is marginal, just above 12%. However, the pro-West camp is relatively weak as well, with only 23% of support. Most of the respondents (52%) want Slovakia to be outside the traditional East and West dichotomy, somewhere in the middle, in between. Public opinion in the Czech Republic is slightly more pro-Western: 48 % of Czechs opt for a position in the middle, while 30% prefer the country's westward orientation and less than 4% an eastward geopolitical orientation. The same percentage of the Hungarians (48%) think their country is somewhere in between the two geopolitical and cultural poles, while 32% prefers the West and 6% prefers the East. These numbers show that the largest groups in all three countries prefers the middle position and could be persuaded and influenced towards the West or the East.

Significant ambivalence is also reflected in the support for NATO membership: 30% of the respondents in the Czech Republic hold that it is neither a good nor a bad thing, while in Hungary the number is 35% and in Slovakia 39%. Only 30% of Slovaks think their NATO membership is a good thing, whereas the group of supporters is as large as 44% in the Czech Republic and 47% in Hungary, which represents a

significant intra-regional difference. Also, while only 6% of Hungarians think NATO is a bad thing, the alliance is unpopular among 17% of people in the Czech Republic and 20% in Slovakia[2].

The goal of decreasing public support for the EU and the integration process has also been successful. Slovakia, traditionally one of the most pro-EU countries, has experienced a steep fall in support for the EU, from 68% in 2010[3] to 52% in 2016. Today, 30% of people claim that EU membership is neither good nor bad, and 14% are against it. These numbers can be explained in the context of the migration crisis hysteria, as the poll was conducted in February 2016, a few weeks after the alarmist messaging climaxed. A bit more optimistic results come from Hungary, where 54% of people think that membership is a good thing, 32% hold the "neither-nor" position and only 8% oppose the country's EU membership. On the other side of the spectre, the view of the traditionally Eurosceptic Czech public towards membership in the EU is rather bleak. Less than 32% consider it a good thing, which is lower than the approval rating of NATO. Almost 24% of Czechs have a negative view of the EU and more than 40% see it as neither a good nor a bad thing. This large a roup would be decisive if a referendum – which is already a public topic – were to be held.

Besides overall support for integration groupings, the poll monitored the specific perceptions and motivations of the respondents. For instance, 78% of the Hungarians, 69% of the Czechs, and 54% of the Slovaks agree that membership in NATO is important for their country's security. Although there are significant differences across the region – with Hungary being the most pro-Atlantic and Slovakia the least one – the majority in each of these countries understand the value of NATO. Also, 78% of the Hungarians, 68% of the Czechs and 54% of the Slovaks think that their country should participate in the defence of an ally, if attacked. The opinion poll conducted in the Czech Republic included an additional question inquiring about a specific scenario of Russia attacking a Baltic state: The willingness to engage in a collective defence was just 47%.

On the other hand, there is considerable resistance towards NATO infrastructure, with 56% of the Czechs and 55% of the Slovaks opposing any allied build-up on their soil. Again, the Hungarians seem to be more favourable towards NATO, with only 34% opposing the NATO infrastructure while 48% support it. These results might reflect the already existing experience with major NATO infrastructure in the country, such as the Pápa airbase hosting the alliance's three Boeing C-17 strategic transport aircraft in the framework of the Strategic Airlift Capability programme.

A particularly disturbing finding comes with the question whether neutrality would provide better security than NATO membership, which is one of the key narratives

[2] An extensive trilateral comparison of public perceptions based on the results of opinion polls conducted by GLOBSEC and its partners in the Czech Republic (European Values, STEM), Hungary (Political Capital, TNS Hoffmann) and Slovakia (FOCUS). The series of opinion polls was supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.

aimed at undermining popular support towards NATO membership: Although only 20% of Slovaks and 17% of Czechs oppose NATO membership, as soon as the word neutrality appears, 39% of Czechs and 47% ofSlovaks respond that neutrality would be better than NATO membership. In the case of Hungary, the number is lower, at 30%.

Anti-Americanism is a significant factor in distrust towards NATO. To illustrate: 59% of Slovaks and 51% of Czechs find the U.S.'s role in Europe and the world negative, and the idea that the U.S. uses NATO to control small countries is believed by 60% and 58% respectively. To the contrary, 46% of the Hungarians see the U.S. engagement in the world and European affairs in a positive light, and 39% negatively. Also, many fewer Hungarians (39%) than their Czech and Slovak counterparts believe that the United States uses NATO to control other countries and impose their will on them.

However, there is a non-negligible positive trend within younger sociological groups. While, for instance, Slovak supporters of Western geopolitical embeddedness in the 65+ age group do not exceed 11%, support among their youngest fellows (18-24 years) is as strong as 40%. Similarly, while only 25% of people over 65 support NATO, almost 37% of the youngsters think the membership in the alliance is a good thing. However, there is a significant vulnerability that might reverse this trend, if not addressed properly: 29% of young Slovaks between 19 and 24 have more confidence in "alternative" media (that of conspiracy theories and anti-West propaganda) and the trend in support for these outlets is constantly growing. Among the whole population, the support rating is 17% (7% in the 65+ group).

The results of the recent Slovak parliamentary elections (March 2016) signal that Eurosceptic or outright anti-EU (anti-NATO) and extremist parties are on the rise, which corresponds with a trend observed in many other countries and evidenced by the results of the elections to the European Parliament. In Slovakia, the crypto-fascist party of Marian Kotleba – which surprisingly entered the parliament – has already used the British Leave camp victory to announce a petition on a similar referendum. Similarly, the former Czech president and notorious anti-EU figure Vaclav Klaus, called for a domino effect in Europe. His successor, Milos Zeman, though claimed he would opt for remaining, has swiftly reacted to the British referendum by calling for one in the Czech Republic, surprisingly adding that a NATO membership referendum should be conducted as well.

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[3] 2010 data based on the Standard Eurobarometer 72.

PART TWO

4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The information war against the West undermines cohesion and aggravates internal divisions, threatening the very existence of national and international institutions, and ultimately peace, security, and prosperity in this part of the world. However, this attack can and should be warded off, and the civilization to which we naturally belong must be defended. The recommendations listed below are the result of intense discussion within an international consortium of organizations, with the ambition of assisting policy-makers in defining national and common policies to counter the present threat.

Official recognition of the problem is a *conditio sine qua non* if any counter-propaganda strategy is to be successful. In addition to official political declarations, moves can be made at lower levels of state bureaucracy by identifying the threat in documents such as intelligence services' annual reports and national security strategies. The inability of state institutions to publicly identify the problem would make it hard for the non-governmental sector and media to conduct public awareness raising activities, as their claims would be dismissed as biased and groundless. Public exposure of the propaganda network (including potentially illegal schemes of funding and cooperation with intelligence services) is an important part of increasing resilience as it delegitimizes and thus disables illicit information channels. Also, communication of political representatives from both government and opposition camps is essential. They are well suited to inform the public and advocate values and institutions to which our countries adhere, because they have exceptional communication skills, unparalleled space in the media, access to information, and authority among their voters. National policy documents conceptualising threat and response to hostile foreign influence & disinformation operations need to be adopted.

Upgrading the security system needs to include changes in the legislative, organisational, financial, and personal setup of the government's institutions. These must undergo thorough analysis, perhaps in the form of a government-run national security audit (already conducted in the Czech Republic). Measures aimed at disrupting propaganda campaigns need to be taken, including the halting of illegal funding and rigorous prosecution of perpetrators of such illegal activities. Monitoring and continuous analysis of propaganda should be the role of intelligence services responsible for informing the government and other state institutions. Periodical briefings for members of parliament would improve understanding of the problem and decrease the penetration of disinformation in this highly influential group. However, these activities need to be conducted in the public domain as well, to build capacities for countering propaganda from the official, non-governmental, and media

standpoints. Monitoring and analysis of the situation is essential in developing counter-narratives and exposing propaganda networks. For example, the Czech Government is launching a new Hybrid Threat Centre with up to 30-man team of experts by 2017.

Comprehensive communication strategies focused on defending and promoting our values and institutions in this information war need to be adopted at both national and international levels. The documents should be based on thorough research and analysis and include modern and out-of-box forms of communication with the public. They must be prepared and implemented together with the non-governmental sector, marketing professionals, and media, as proved effective in the pre-accession period. National communication strategies should be further developed into communication strategies of the respective state institutions (especially of the government and the foreign, defence, interior, education, culture, finance, and economy ministries). Communication in national languages is necessary to overcome language barriers, especially as the other side communicates this way. Translations of foreign content (such as books, articles, videos) should be supported on a large scale. Unlike in the EU, information on NATO's website is only available in English, French, Ukrainian, and Russian. An agreement on including more language versions is necessitated, especially when it comes to the official languages of the most vulnerable countries.

Development of our own narratives, both negative (based on myth-busting, fact-checking of anti-Western and radical propaganda, informing of the situation in Russia) and positive (based on the benefits of the Western values and institutions) is a must. We must monitor the information environment and provide evidence of the lies and hate speech spread by the other side to question their credibility. But this is not enough; the attack on our values (such as democracy, liberty, human rights) and institutions (especially the EU and NATO) needs to be counter-balanced by their active defence and support. The story of Central Europe in the EU and NATO is one of success; the public should be given sufficient arguments to stand behind these integration projects. Addressing the problem of anti-Americanism is also important, as it is one of the main drivers of the negative stance towards NATO.

Support for quality journalism can make a difference in the information war. Adherence to the basic principles of journalism, including fact checking and crosschecking of information, is what differentiates the traditional media from their alternatives, often serving as propaganda mouthpieces of the Kremlin. The role of public media is therefore indispensable. Additional support for their domestic and international news boards, discussion formats, investigative journalism, as well as increased funding for quality documentary production in related areas is important. Discussion needs to take place on the ethics of today's journalism, as media in the post-communist area tend to lean towards

balance at any cost, rather than the truth. Also, the development and improvement of media literacy skills need to be promoted, especially through the education system, and the oft-discussed problem of poor journalism education at many of our universities needs to be dealt with.

Defending the online battlefield from propaganda by developing and employing proper capabilities is necessary to counter disinformation, radicalisation, and recruitment. Arbitrary censorship is unthinkable in a democratic society, but there should be no tolerance of any illegal behaviour, especially hate speech or propagation of violations of human and civil rights. The online environment needs to be monitored and legal action taken against physical and legal entities violating the law. Also, government and non-government initiatives aimed at countering illicit narratives in the online environment need to be supported. Technological solutions and programmes countering trolling and propaganda must be developed, supported, and implemented. Last but not least, substantial strategic communication and cyber defence capacities need to be built within the military and intelligence services, to protect our institutions and societies from large-scale propaganda attacks in times of peace and war.

Adaptation of the education system is important to protect the young generation victimisation in the information war. This generation has not experienced a totalitarian regime or the integration process in Europe and is vulnerable to the attempts of the so-called alternative media disseminating conspiracy theories, hate speech, extremist ideologies, and disinformation, and an increase in support of extremism has been reported. Curriculums need to focus on the development of critical skills such as media/ digital literacy, critical thinking, methodology of science, knowledge of foreign languages, as well as key formative matters such as modern history and the effects of totalitarian regimes, Euro-Atlantic integration processes and institutions, and Western values. Our education systems should help promote democratic citizenship by employing modern and entertaining tools such as video-documentaries, games, personal experience, interactive museums, and other field visits (such as to Nazi and communist concentration camps).

International cooperation is expected as many countries of the EU and NATO face the same threat of Russian propaganda. Activities may include the exchange of good practices at various levels and in various fields (intelligence, education, foreign affairs, defence, de-radicalisation, media, etc.). Cooperation between the Czech Republic and Slovakia could be very effective, as their information space and propaganda actors (as well as those opposing them) are highly connected. Also, international bodies, such as the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence and EEAS East Strategic Communication Task Force need to be supported (funding, personnel) by the EU and NATO member countries.

Finally, **fixing our own internal problems**, especially when it comes to corruption and the unfinished development process of the rule of law and good governance, is essential in gaining the trust of the public in democratic institutions and Euro-Atlantic integration. Our weaknesses are a source of anger and frustration, fertile ground for populist and extremist political forces, and outright anti-Western propaganda. Russian propaganda exploits our perceived historical and societal grievances and antipathies to its benefit. Extreme and radical threads are present in every society, but we need to limit their ability to expand and penetrate mainstream thinking. Comprehensive national and international strategies must be adopted and their implementation sufficiently appropriated.

ANNEX: SELECTED TABLES

(all numbers in %; format: Czech Republic / Hungary / Slovakia)

TABLE 1: Where do you want Czech Republic / Hungary / Slovakia to belong?				
	The West	In between	The East	Don't know
TOTAL	30 / 32 / 23	48 / 48 / 52	4 / 6 / 12	18 / 14 / 13W

TABLE 2A: Three countries Czech Republic should have close relations (open question)	
1. Slovakia	63
2. Germany	51
3. Austria	39
4. Poland	32
5. Russia	20
6. Great Britain	14
7. United States	12
8. Hungary	10
9. France	7
10. China	7

TABLE 2B: Three countries Hungary should have close relations (open question) Percent of Cases	
1. Germany	44
2. Austria	28
3. Russia	16
4. United Kingdom	13
5. United States	13
6. Poland	13
7. Slovakia	8
8. France	8
9. Romania	6
10. Czech Republic	5

TABLE 2C: Three countries Slovakia should have close relations (open question)

1.	Czech Republic	67
2.	Austria	37
3.	Poland	35
4.	Hungary	32
5.	Germany	32
6.	Russia	29
7.	Ukraine	10
8.	United States	7
9.	Great Britain	6
10.	Switzerland	5

TABLE 3: Membership in international grouppings

	Positive	Negative	Neither	Don't know
EU	32 / 54 / 52	24 / 8 / 14	41 / 32 / 30	4 / 6 / 4
NATO	44 / 47 / 30	17 / 6 / 20	30 / 35 / 39	9 / 13 / 11
UN	56 / 56 / 51	9 / 4 / 8	27 / 29 / 29	9 / 11 / 11
V4	54 / 47 / 63	7 / 3 / 4	26 / 31 / 24	14 / 18 / 9

TABLE 4: Role of the US in Europe and the World

Definitely positive	4 / 5 / 4	35 / 46 / 32
Rather positive	31 / 41 / 28	
Rather negative	32 / 32 / 37	51 / 39 / 59
Definitely negative	19 / 7 / 21	
Don't know	14 / 15 / 9	14 / 15 / 9

TABLE 5: Approval of "alternative" (conspiracy, anti-West) media

I definitely believe the traditional media more.	27 / 36 / 34	59 / 71 / 72
I tend to believe the traditional media more.	32 / 35 / 38	
I tend to believe the "alternative" media more.	15 / 12 / 11	24 / 16 / 17
I definitely believe the "alternative" media more.	9 / 4 / 6	

TABLE 6: Do you agree with the following statements?

	Positive	Negative	Don't know
NATO membership is good for Czech republic's security.	69 / 78 / 54	26 / 12 / 35	6 /10 / 11
Czech republic should help defend an attacked ally.	68 / 69 / 54	25 / 21 / 35	7 / 11 / 11
Czech republic should allow NATO infrastructure on its soil.	40 / 48 / 36	56 / 34 / 55	5 / 18 / 10
USA control countries like Czech republic through their NATO membership	58 / 39 / 61	36 / 37 / 29	6 / 24 / 10
USA and NATO are responsible for the Ukraine crisis.	38 / 37 / 48	49 / 33 / 37	13 / 30 / 15
The neutrality would provide Czech republic more security than NATO.	39 / 30 / 47	52 / 48 / 36	9 / 23 / 17
NATO puts the Slavic nations against each other.	33 / X / 43	58 / X / 43	9 / X / 14
NATO is an aggressive pact and a threat for others (e.g. Russia)	36 / 25 / 43	55 / 54 / 42	9 / 20 / 15
We spend too much on defence.	35 / 25 / 41	52 / 53 / 45	13 / 22 / 15
Russia has the right to influence Ukraine's future as it is in its sphere.	28 / 36 / 37	62 / 37 / 44	11 / 27 / 19
NATO enlargements are in violation of a pledge given to Russia.	33 / 28 / 37	47 / 35 / 39	20 / 37 / 24
Russia could ensure Hungary's security more than NATO	X / 26 / X	X / 51 / X	X / 22 / 0

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